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NCLB’s Ultimate Restructuring Alternatives: 
 Do they Improve the Quality of Education? 
 
Executive Summary 
Across the nation, the final stage of school restructuring is being reached by an 
inexorably increasing number of schools. Under the No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) law, if a school does not make its adequate yearly progress targets after 
four previous years of being “in need of improvement,” it must implement a 
fundamental restructuring plan. The restructuring options are as follows: (1) turn 
the school operations over to the state, (2) turn the operations over to a private 
company, (3) reopen as a charter school, or (4) reconstitute the school by 
replacing some or all of the teachers, staff and administrators. There is a fifth 
alternative of applying “any other” fundamental school restructuring, an option 
now receiving new attention. 
 
It is essential that we know how these restructuring options work in practice—
particularly as the law is now due for reauthorization. This brief reviews the 
independent research on the ultimate sanctions and provides recommendations 
designed to enhance school improvement. 
 
Overall, there is little or no evidence to suggest that any of these options delivers 
the promised improvements in academic achievement. In light of this review of 
what is known, it is recommended that policymakers: 
 
 Refrain from relying on restructuring sanctions (takeovers, private 
management, charters, and reconstitutions) to effect school improvement. They 
have produced negative by-products without yielding systemic positive effects. 
 Refrain from supporting the expansion of charter schools. Evidence indicates 
that, on average, they do not improve test scores or spawn the promised 
innovative practices. Furthermore, they may increase socioeconomic or ethnic 
segregation. 
 Support research on the effectiveness of alternative improvement strategies 
that are seen by some as “best practices” but have not to date been supported 
by careful study. These include school planning, turn-around specialists, data 
analysis, and instructional coaches. 
 Ensure that mandated requirements for technical assistance are met so that 
states and districts have the capacity to implement, support and sustain 
improvements. 
 Support strategies that have been empirically demonstrated to yield significant 
school improvement. These include early education, longer school years and 
days, small school communities, intense personal intervention, strong 
counseling, and social support systems. 
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NCLB’s Ultimate Restructuring Alternatives: 
Do they Improve the Quality of Education? 
 
William J. Mathis 
 
Introduction 
NCLB Provisions 
An ever-increasing number of schools are being identified as “in need of 
improvement” under No Child Left Behind (NCLB), and of these, many are 
reaching the final stages of sanctions under that law. Education Week reports that 
the number of schools identified as needing improvement increased 28% between 
2007 and 2008.1 The designation is applied when a school misses test score 
targets for two consecutive years, either for the total student population or for any 
sub-group (economically disadvantaged, racial and ethnic groups, students with 
disabilities, and students with limited English language proficiency, for example). 
While state rules vary, the sanctions are fundamentally based on reading and math 
tests in grades three through eight and in one grade in high school. 
For such schools, each consecutive year of missed targets brings 
increasingly severe penalties. First, they must provide students with options for 
attending other schools; then, they must also pay external service providers for 
tutoring; then, they must implement certain corrective actions; and then make 
plans for a change in governance. The ultimate sanction, reached in the fifth year 
of “needing improvements,” is mandated school restructuring. 
By Education Week’s tally, 17.9% of the nation’s schools are now 
identified as “in need of improvement.”  Nearly a quarter of these, concentrated in 
urban areas in a limited number of states,2 are in year five, the final restructuring 
stage.3 The Center on Educational Policy (CEP) reports that 7% of schools 
serving high concentrations of students with social and economic needs (Title I 
schools) are now in the ultimate, restructuring phase—a 56% increase from the 
previous year.4 The Department of Education describes the NCLB restructuring 
mandate as follows:  
 
If a school fails to make adequate yearly progress for a fifth 
straight year, the school district must initiate plans for restructuring 
the school. This may include reopening the school as a charter 
school, replacing all or most of the school staff, or turning over 
school operations either to the state or a private company with a 
demonstrated record of effectiveness.5 
 
Although the federal government’s guide for parents does not particularly 
highlight a fifth option, “any other major restructuring of a school’s governance 
arrangement,” this possibility is also becoming increasingly important.6 
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Urgency of the Issue 
NCLB, which is actually the current iteration of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (originally passed in 1965), is overdue for 
congressional reauthorization. Therefore, it is important both to anticipate the 
number of schools that may face restructuring sanctions as well as to assess the 
effectiveness of those sanctions. These factors are critical to determining 
reauthorization provisions, the federal role in education, and public perception 
and support for schools. 
The question of how many schools may ultimately face restructuring 
reflects the urgency of this issue. Because the law requires 100% of all students to 
attain proficiency on state standards, including those in each of the sub-groups, 
researchers have illustrated that, eventually, virtually all schools can be expected 
to reach the fifth and final stage of school restructuring.7 Even with a 2%-3% 
safety valve for children with severe disabilities, universal proficiency is 
practically unattainable. In addition, the sanctions will fall most immediately on 
schools with high concentrations of poor and minority children, because these 
children tend to have lower test scores and because the NCLB disaggregation 
approach effectively penalizes more diverse schools. Thus, whether restructuring 
sanctions can truly transform schools—closing the achievement gap and resolving 
historical inequities—is a question of enormous import for schools as well as for 
society. 
Among the federally prescribed restructuring options, charter schools and 
educational management organizations (EMOs) have enjoyed considerable 
popularity and media attention. There has also been an outpouring of partisan 
think-tank press releases and reports extolling the virtues of restructuring.8 To 
date, however, independent, empirical research has been eclipsed by political 
actions and orations favoring restructuring options.9 Far more scarce than 
promotional rhetoric—though far more important—has been high-quality, peer-
reviewed research on whether these strategies actually improve schools.  
 
Do the Ultimate Sanctions Work? 
Overview 
This brief examines available research evidence on the effectiveness of the 
ultimate sanctions. Do they work? What is and isn’t known about them? Is there 
any reason to modify or eliminate any of the mechanisms? 
Following is a description of the frequency and effectiveness of each of 
the four primary methods the law prescribes (state takeovers, private 
management, charter schools, and reconstitutions). Since test scores are the law’s 
major assessment mechanism, each sanction is evaluated for effects on test scores 
as well as for effects on other vital educational quality factors. The emergence of 
the fifth category, “any other,” is also examined. These efforts are summarized, 
and suggestions for improvement are provided. 
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As the quantity and quality of the knowledge base varies considerably for 
each of the methods, this review draws from both pre-NCLB and post-NCLB 
evidence. Often, the restructuring methods overlap—such as when state takeovers 
employ charter schools. In such cases, the overlap is noted. Undoubtedly, there 
are interactive effects when multiple methods are employed in one location. 
Likewise, cumulative legacies of earlier pre-restructuring reform activities are 
present (e.g., the NCLB-mandated public school choice and tutoring reforms 
would still be in place). However, the emphasis here is on addressing the evidence 
in each area as discretely as the data allow. 
 
State Takeovers 
Frequency   
The political and emotional appeal of the state taking over schools in crisis 
resonates strongly with many. Particularly in urban areas where parents see school 
buildings in disrepair, gang culture, safety problems, inadequate resources, 
corruption, patronage and excessive drop-outs and low test scores, a clean sweep 
is very appealing.10 Ziebarth says takeovers are “usually due to a combination of 
inept administration, fiscal mismanagement, corrupt governance and academic 
problems within the school district.”11 In this thinking, somebody outside the 
system, with a strong hand, must shake up the lethargy and institutional inertia. 
The state takeover section of the federal law requires that state law allow 
takeovers, and also that the state agree to the particular takeover of a school or 
district. Twenty-nine states had such provisions in state policy or laws by 2004. 
Yet, takeovers are infrequent.12 Only five states had exercised the school level 
takeover option by 2005. Even then, the numbers of schools taken over within a 
district are in the single digits, except for in storm-ravaged New Orleans.13 In a 
2007 GAO survey of principals of schools in restructuring, 5% reported using the 
state takeover option.14 Even though the GAO proportion is small (less than 1% of 
schools), it is still a considerably larger number than other surveys and estimates. 
Differences in definitions are likely at play. 
This low frequency is likely due to the absence of state capacity to send in 
a team to take over all or part of local operations. Particularly in states with high 
numbers of identified schools, state agencies do not have the staff, funding, 
technical assistance capacity, data systems or federal support to effectively 
implement this option.15 Thus, the shading of takeovers into less intense “any 
other” solutions may be seen as an inexpensive and practical alternative. As 
addressed later in this brief, however, sending a “turnaround specialist” or a 
“consultant” to a school or district may be either a substantive or tokenistic 
gesture toward fulfilling state assistance requirements. 
In practice, the purpose and the extent of past takeovers have varied. Some 
are for limited purposes, such as financial irregularities or central office 
administrative paralysis. Some replace school boards but leave other operational 
features intact. In some instances, the mayor is granted authority by the state to 
run the district. A specially appointed oversight czar or committee is another 
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variation. In some cases, an educational management organization or corporation 
is given authority.16 Combined with the small number of cases overall, these 
variations in forms and local contexts caution against generalizations on effective 
forms of takeovers. 
Yet one clear message from these earlier instances is that takeovers are 
inevitably controversial, tend to generate extensive media coverage, and foster 
loud political claims. Such public rhetoric is far more common than objective 
research or reports on the initiatives. For example, the post Hurricane Katrina 
formation of New Orleans “Recovery School District” of 66 charter schools has 
resulted in political exultations and condemnations despite little scientific study.17 
The Louisiana state effort to add 10 more schools in Baton Rouge and Shreveport 
to the takeover list has likewise spawned fierce community opposition and a 
lawsuit.18 Earlier high-profile takeovers in Chicago (1995), Cleveland (1997) and 
Baltimore (1997) were the subject of extensive media controversy.19 The 
Philadelphia takeover (addressed below, under EMOs) also continues to foster 
media coverage.20 
Perhaps it is the intensity of the media attention that creates the impression 
that takeovers are common. However, Wong and Shen reported in 2002 that the 
zenith of takeovers was in 1996 and 1997, with six takeovers in each year.21 In 
later data, the Center on Education Policy’s study on the effects of restructuring 
reported none of its five sample states employ a takeover strategy.22 States have 
limited capacities for effective interventions, and the low number reported overall 
suggests that states are reluctant to go down this road. 
The Center for Comprehensive School Reform, in its 2005 monograph on 
school takeovers, bluntly states that “there is no research base to indicate under 
what conditions this option would lead to improved academic outcomes for 
students or why a state would take this path.”23 
 
Effect on Test Scores 
Wong and Shen similarly conclude that “research has lagged” about the 
student achievement effects of takeovers and note that it is “difficult to make 
generalizations about student achievement.”24 However, they go on to report, on 
the basis of 14 cases, that elementary students seem to fare better academically, as 
they do not have to reverse previous negative effects. They also note that when 
administrative and political turmoil ensues, achievement scores suffer.25 A 2009 
study, commissioned by a Milwaukee civic group, reviewed the achievement 
score literature. The researchers found little conclusive evidence on test score 
improvements; they also found that resulting changes could be attributed to a 
multitude of sources.26 Ziebarth, writing for the Education Commission of the 
States, says: “The bottom line is that takeovers, for the most part, have yet to 
produce dramatic and consistent increases in student performance.” He explains 
that takeovers generally have little link to the classroom and that gains, if any, 
appear to be in central office and administrative procedures rather than in 
improvements in instruction.27 
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Other Effects   
While state or district takeovers are often justified for district abuses such 
as financial irregularities, patronage and incompetence, even these interventions 
spark intense political controversy. Takeovers cause internal upheaval, although 
they may establish much-needed order and stability in chaotic situations. In 
instances where the stated reason is to control costs, a likely effect of the action is 
a decrease in spending on education, which could be good (to the extent it 
increases efficiency) or unfortunate (to the extent it decreases supports and 
resources for student learning).28 Wong and Shen contend that mayoral controls 
are more effective, but the Milwaukee Public Policy Forum cautions that it all 
depends on the particular mayor and circumstances.29 
On the whole, however, little can be said with certainty about the impact 
of takeovers. Given such a small number of cases and the inability to isolate the 
effects of particular variables amidst a great deal of noise, the Center for 
Comprehensive School Reform has succinctly summarized the literature about 
takeovers as being “often about what doesn’t work” (p. 24).30 
 
Private Management: Educational Management Organizations (EMOs) 
Frequency 
EMOs appeal to politicians and to some parents for many of the same 
reasons as state takeovers. Center city urban blight, poor building maintenance, 
disruption, poorly qualified teachers, safety, high dropouts and poor test scores 
sound a siren call. When EMO managers say they will come in and sort out 
corruption, throw out bad teachers, impose curricular reforms, break the union 
strangle-hold, dismiss the bureaucrats and save money in the process, the promise 
makes for a potent political message. 
Molnar, Miron and Urschel reported in 2008 that 50 companies operated 
533 schools with a total enrollment of 254,413 students. The majority of the EMO 
schools are primary schools. Both the number of schools and the number of 
companies has leveled off in the past two years, even as the total number of 
children they enroll has increased. Of these students, 88% are in schools operated 
by 15 major corporations, with Edison being the largest (48,000 students).31 
During the first decade of the 21st century, EMOs began shifting their focus away 
from operating schools and toward supplemental services (such as tutoring, 
summer schools, and consulting) catering to the requirements of the NCLB 
legislation.32  
As is true for state takeovers, however, the use of EMOs is not as 
prevalent as media attention would suggest. Hartford, Connecticut, was the first 
district to be taken over by an EMO, Education Alternatives, in 1994. In just two 
years, however, there was a parting of the ways amid great acrimony and 
contractual disputes.33 Philadelphia, which disbanded its school board and 
replaced it with a School Reform Commission, is the nation’s largest experiment 
in mandatory restructuring. More than 45 of its elementary and middle schools 
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were turned over to seven different private management groups in 2002, including 
for-profit corporations, non-profits and universities.  
In 2004, only 14 states had laws specifically authorizing EMOs34 although 
such private schools were operating in 28 states in 2008.35 The Center on 
Educational Policy recently studied restructuring schools in five of these EMO 
states. Yet, except for California (where 10% of restructuring schools chose the 
EMO option), no more than 2% of restructuring schools chose the EMO model.36 
The GAO’s national estimate is 9% of the five percent of Title I schools in 
restructuring.37 When the rate of EMO implementation is considered as a 
percentage of all of a state’s schools, or as a percentage of Title I schools, the rate 
drops below one percent.38 
 
Effect on Test Scores 
Again, this restructuring approach is highly controversial and generates a 
great deal of media attention, while only limited research exists to document its 
effects. Philadelphia’s restructuring efforts have been the most intensely 
scrutinized, but studies on the achievement score impact are hotly debated. In 
2007, the RAND Corporation provided a test-score evaluation of this reform after 
four years of operation.39 The study found that none of the three external provider 
groups (for-profits, non-profits and universities) produced a statistically 
significant advantage. While Philadelphia did register test score gains, these gains 
“have generally not exceeded the gains of low-achieving schools elsewhere in 
Pennsylvania”(p.xiii). The private providers argued the schools would have done 
worse without them, but the researchers found “no evidence supporting this 
view”(p.xiv). The RAND study concluded: “In sum, with four years of 
experience, we find no evidence of differential academic benefits that would 
support the additional expenditures on private managers” (italics in the original) 
(p.xiv).40 The National Center for the Study of Privatization of Education at 
Columbia University confirmed the RAND results in its independent analysis.41 
Responding to RAND’s high-profile evaluation, Harvard Professor Paul 
Peterson produced his own evaluation, which in many regards was a rebuttal of 
the RAND report. He concluded that the private managers did increase the 
number of students scoring at a proficient level and pointed out that the RAND 
report could not be considered a conclusive test of EMOs, as it dealt with only the 
lowest-performing schools and (he contended) did not properly consider 
demographics.42 
Both reports immediately became ammunition in the political battle, with 
the RAND report employed to call for the firing of private vendors and the 
Peterson report extolled by the Wall Street Journal as affirming market models. In 
an independent review of both reports, University of Colorado Professor Derek 
Briggs gives the edge to the RAND report for the use of more comprehensive 
scale scores, while the Peterson report is considered limited as it only yielded 
positive findings around one narrow point at the lowest part of the test-score 
distribution. Furthermore, Briggs observes, the claims of success of the market 
model were not founded because the students and their parents were assigned to 
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schools (thus minimizing market competition effects). Briggs cautions that neither 
of these studies should be considered definitive.43 
In a 2009 follow-up study, Peterson and Chingos compared Philadelphia 
schools that had been taken over by for-profit companies with those taken over by 
non-profit companies. They concluded that non-profit EMOs had a generally 
negative effect, although not statistically significant. A generally positive for-
profit effect was reported, however, although statistically significant only for 
math. The authors speculate that the difference was due to for-profit managers 
having a greater incentive for success—namely, the risk that they would be put 
out of business.44 Of course, it could be argued that non-profits managers could 
face the same fate.  
As is probably evident from the above discussion, knowledge concerning 
the impact of EMOs on achievement is confounded by political disputes about 
effective school improvement models, power struggles, charges (by both sides) of 
ineffectiveness and incompetence, and sometimes even court fights. Moreover, 
the combative parties include not only politicians, educators and parents, but think 
tanks espousing a market model for education. 
The effectiveness of Edison, the nation’s largest EMO, is similarly 
debated. In 2004-2005, Edison operated 103 schools, but this number had dropped 
to 80 by 2008.45 It commissioned Brian Gill, who later was lead author of the 
RAND Philadelphia study, to evaluate its programs. In the first three years, 
Edison schools recorded declines in standardized test scores. In years four and 
five, scores bounced back, but only enough to recover their losses from the initial 
years. However, the huge variations between comparison schools and Edison 
schools were remarkable, often swinging as much as plus or minus two standard 
deviations. Ultimately, the conclusions about the efficacy of Edison schools were 
“equivocal.”46 
A multi-state study employing regression modeling, conducted by the 
Center on Education Policy, found that EMOs show no advantage over other 
approaches in helping schools meet Adequate Yearly Progress benchmarks.47 
Overall, the research shows that EMOs demonstrate no clear pattern of 
improvements in test scores. 
 
Other Effects 
As noted above, in the RAND evaluation of the Edison schools, the first 
three years saw scores decline, as new curriculum, instruction and operational 
systems disrupted the flow of schools, before bouncing back to pre-reform levels. 
This signals disruptive transition effects. Teacher turnover in Philadelphia was 
reported as three times the district average and was particularly pronounced at 
schools operated by Edison and another EMO, Victory Schools.48 Implications for 
teacher quality and turnover are discussed below, in the charter school section.  
In an interesting study using GPS mapping, EMOs were found to be 
geographically repositioning themselves in metropolitan Detroit by locating 
schools in communities with lower concentrations of poor children.49 This would 
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suggest a cherry-picking strategy, one that hints at a policy that increases 
segregation. 
The conclusions of the RAND Edison study on EMOs are strikingly 
similar to the Center for Comprehensive School Reform’s recommendations on 
state takeover schools. No achievement test edge is reported, and the RAND, the 
Reform Center and the Edison reports all list extensive recommendations on how 
future EMO implementations could be improved.50 
 
Charter Schools 
 
Frequency 
Far more popular than state takeovers and EMOs are charter schools, 
intended to empower local communities to break through excessive district and 
state bureaucracy and to become active incubators for innovative practices. In 
exchange for freedom from regulation, they were to be highly accountable for 
educational outcomes. Depending on the state, charter schools were also 
encouraged to embrace a specific educational philosophy or niche. 
From the first law in Minnesota (1991), charter schools have now spread 
to 40 states with 4,000 schools enrolling almost a million students, although the 
vast majority of these schools arose through mechanisms other than NCLB 
restructuring. State charter school laws and practices vary considerably among 
and within states, as does the organizational infrastructure beneath a school or 
group of schools. And, as noted earlier, there is some overlap of categories. About 
25% of all charter schools are operated by EMOs; in Michigan, 80% of charter 
schools are managed by private corporations.51 Even so, less than 2% of all 
schools facing mandatory restructuring chose the charter school option in the 
Center on Education Policy’s five-state study.52 The GAO’s national estimate is 
an even lower 1%.53 
 
Effect on Test Scores 
Like the other restructuring alternatives, charter schools generate 
considerable public controversy and ideological passion, clouding the body of 
scientific evidence.  
Setting aside the rhetoric, however, there is a strong research consensus 
that charter schools show no substantial achievement advantage on average.54 
One of the most prominent studies on test results in charter schools came 
from the federal government’s Institute of Education Sciences, which in 2005 
analyzed a national sample of NAEP test scores for charter schools. This 
government-sponsored, independent, cross-sectional data analysis found that 
when ethnic background and reading scores were considered, there were no 
significant differences between charter and regular school students.55  
Similarly, University of Illinois professors Christopher and Sarah 
Lubienski examined national assessment data on mathematics achievement in a 
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commissioned study for the Institute of Educational Sciences. Again, using a 
cross-sectional analysis, they controlled for a wide variety of external factors 
including socio-economic and racial characteristics. At the fourth grade level, 
charter schools performed significantly lower than public schools. At the eighth 
grade level, charter schools performed slightly better but not significantly so.56 
In 2008, researchers at Western Michigan University undertook an 
exhaustive review of the literature for various types of school choice programs. 
They rated the various studies on quality and reported on 47 studies, almost all of 
which were state-level studies, with 19 studies reporting positive results, 16 
reporting negative findings, and the remainder showing mixed conclusions.57 
University of Washington Professor Paul Hill and his colleagues in 2006 
examined every state-level charter school study since 2000. The researchers noted 
that media stories based on these research studies have often been misleading, and 
dueling ideological studies are common. Of the state studies, 40 reported test-
score analysis. None reported long-range effects. The most common finding was 
null or mixed findings. In no case were the observed differences strong.58 
Stanford professor Martin Carnoy and colleagues also reviewed the 
literature and came to similar conclusions. They concentrated on state-level 
studies and confirmed the national NAEP studies of “no charter school 
achievement advantage.”59 
In the RAND summary of what we know about vouchers and charter 
schools, the authors find that the results from charter schools are mixed for 
academic achievement. In terms of long-term effects, and effects on students in 
public schools, there is no good evidence one way or the other.60 
Departing from the generally “no meaningful or significant” differences 
theme, an elegantly designed study by Bifulco and Ladd followed five entire 
grade cohorts of North Carolina students for five years. They found that charter 
school students performed substantially lower than public school students and that 
the differences were not erased even after several years. Thirty percent of the test 
score deficiency was attributed to high student turnover rates.61 On the other hand, 
Hanushek, Kain and Rivken examined Texas scores and concluded that Texas 
charter students fully recovered as the program matured.62  
Research on charter schools has increased in quantity and quality over the 
past several years, but the results remain unchanged. When controlling for 
demographic factors, charter schools show no advantage. 
 
Other Effects 
Segregation. A significant concern, as Cobb and Glass found in an earlier 
(1999) study, is that charter schools result in ethnic segregation. In Arizona, a 
high-frequency charter school state, the authors found white students to be 
enrolled in charter schools at a far higher rate than in their contiguous public 
schools—charter schools typically over-enrolled white students by a margin of 20 
percentage points. The charter schools where ethnic minority students 
predominated were generally vocational schools or “schools of last resort” for 
students expelled from traditional public schools. 63 
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In reviewing the increasing body of research findings on segregation in 
various types of choice arrangements, Mickelson and her colleagues at the 
University of North Carolina found that charter school policies result in 
segregation by race, ethnic identity and socio-economic status. Furthermore, 
charters with an entrance examination and schools for special needs children also 
have a segregating effect.64 
Coming to the same conclusion in his review of state charter school 
studies, Miron has asked policy makers to address the resegregation of public 
schools by race, class and ability.65 
Educational Innovation. A central claim made by promoters of charter 
schools is that, freed from bureaucratic regulation, they are able to freely 
innovate. However, in a 2000 Michigan study examining practices in charter and 
regular public schools, Mintrom found “the degree of similarity is more striking 
than the differences.” Some charter schools were doing innovative things but 
others were described as “willfully isolated backwaters of educational practice.”66  
Christopher Lubienski expounds on this theme, concluding that market 
models provide no incentive for innovation and that public schools have been as 
successful as private schools in fostering innovation. He opines that the claim for 
innovation was a marketing tool for advancing various forms of school choice.67  
Stanford Professor Martin Carnoy and his colleagues commented that the 
similarity in achievement levels reflects the similarities in practice between 
charter and regular public schools. They reason that the touted “freedom to 
innovate” rationale is likely misplaced. They observe that the bureaucratic rules 
are primarily to prevent fraud and corruption rather than to stifle innovation. 
Well-managed and poorly managed schools exist in both public schools and in 
charter schools.68 
Teacher Turnover/Teacher Quality. Celeste Carruthers examined the 
characteristics of all public school teachers and charter school teachers in North 
Carolina from 1997 to 2007. Among her findings were the following: (1) charter 
schools experienced high rates of inexperienced and uncertified teachers, (2) yet, 
the regularly certified mainstream teachers who shifted to charter schools were 
equivalent in paper qualifications, and (3) charters draw a larger proportion of 
alternatively licensed or temporarily credentialed teachers, which in the North 
Carolina context are associated with lower achievement. While the results are 
nuanced, Carruthers finds overall that charter schools appear to be “. . .losing the 
war for teachers with high classroom performance statewide.”69  
In Philadelphia, the percentage of certified teachers dropped from 83% to 
73% in the four conversion charter schools and fell to 40% in one school. This 
was partially attributable to the disruption of major organizational changes and 
may also be associated with the drop in test scores found in the first years of 
charter operation.70 
As noted in the following section, recruiting high-quality teachers in high-
needs schools is problematic. 
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Reconstituting Schools 
Media coverage of reconstituted schools has also been intense. For 
example, a recent Time magazine cover (calling attention to the feature article) 
displayed D.C. Chancellor Michelle Rhee, praising the “bold-talking chancellor” 
while lamenting the high cost and low performance of United States schools, 
particularly those in Washington, D.C. The article itself included such subtitles as 
“Scorched Earth” and highly favorable comments on the chancellor’s shutting 
down 21 schools and firing 100 employees “from the district’s famously bloated 
900-person central bureaucracy.” The dismissal of 270 teachers and 36 principals 
was characterized as reformist work.71 
School reconstitution is bolstered by such positive media portrayal as well 
as by the approval of citizens who endorse extreme approaches. It involves 
replacing principals, teachers and staff (or segments of them) to establish a new 
climate, philosophy and structure in the “failed” school. 
 
Frequency 
The first reconstitution, which involved 14 schools over two years, took 
place in 1983 in San Francisco. By 2004, twenty-eight states had laws or policies 
in place, although the actual reconstitution frequency is quite low. The Education 
Commission of the States (ECS) lists only seven districts engaged in 
reconstitution, each involving only a handful of schools in urban areas. Among 
these, internal district-based reconstitutions outnumber state-ordered actions.72 
The CEP reports that reconstituting staff occurred in only 3% of the 
schools under NCLB restructuring—a small fraction of 1% of the nation’s total 
schools.73 The GAO estimate is that 27% of the restructuring Title I schools 
replaced “all or most” staff. This translates into about 1.35% of all Title I schools 
and less than 1% of the nation’s schools.74 Although the frequency is low, the 
CEP and GAO estimates are higher than the ECS count. 
However, the tallies are confounded by the fact that the degree of staff 
reconstitution is unknown. Whether a given instance involved a massive house-
cleaning or merely a shift of only one or a few staff members is not clear.  
Often, the new staff arrangement is accompanied by a new curriculum 
(98% of schools in restructuring), joint school planning (92%), new training, the 
presence of a state or local turn-around specialist, an extended school day or year, 
and the like.75 
 
Effect on Test Scores 
It should be noted first that isolating the effects of reconstitution is a 
difficult task. For example, the most frequent “reconstitution” is simply replacing 
the principal, a strategy that exists quite independent of NCLB and employed in 
17% of the schools in the CEP five-state study. Principal transfers, career changes 
and replacements are a common occurrence in most districts. Likewise, teacher 
transfers occur on a voluntary and non-voluntary basis on a regular basis in most 
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school districts. Often, the reported reasons for a staffing change are not the actual 
reasons, so sorting out the effects of a formal restructuring from routine 
operations does not make for clean categories. Still, researchers have made efforts 
to assess impact. 
Recall that the Center on Education Policy sorted out reconstitution effects 
using a regression model in its five study states—an approach that offered a 
conclusion for reconstitution as well as the other options: “None of the five 
federal restructuring options were associated with a greater likelihood of a school 
making AYP overall or in reading or math alone.”76 Similarly, the Education 
Commission of the States reported that the reconstitution evidence to date is 
mostly anecdotal and noted that the limited evidence in San Francisco reflected 
uneven test score results. The results “are debatable simply because of a lack of 
strong research evidence.”77 
Little is known, then, both because the number of cases to date is small, 
and the reforming schools typically introduce a broad array of other changes at 
the same time. Untangling influences on outcomes is also complicated by the fact 
that staff replacements can be more or less inclusive, and loud political rhetoric 
broadcasts are often persuasive, even when lacking, or indeed contradicted by, 
good evidence. 
 
Other Effects  
Based on its case studies, the CEP explicitly recommends against 
reconstitution as a restructuring approach. Replacing all or most of a school staff 
is chaotic and disruptive to the preparations for the opening of a new school year. 
Moreover, institutional history is lost and basic operational systems are disrupted. 
CEP expressed the following major concerns: Finding qualified teachers in 
challenging urban areas can be extraordinarily difficult if not impossible; planning 
with the new faculty was impossible when staffing was not complete before the 
fall opening; and collective bargaining rules often prevented the assignment of the 
most highly qualified staff to the areas of greatest need. Twelve of the study’s 17 
cases had difficulty replacing staff, and many started the year with substitutes.78 
The researchers also reported more positive findings, noting that low-
quality teachers were often removed, negative school climates changed, and order 
re-established in chaotic situations. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggested 
that the staff and surrounding community were stigmatized and demoralized. In 
addition, CEP noted that since each reconstituted school was already five years 
into school improvement activities before the reconstitution took place, the 
previous years of improvement work were often erased or undermined.79 
 
“Any Other” Restructuring Efforts 
While charter schools have been the subject of extensive study, and 
EMOs, takeovers and reconstitutions have been the center of high-profile debates, 
the most frequently used restructuring mechanism (by far) continues to charge 
ahead in relative obscurity. In addition to the four major reform strategies, the 
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federal law includes the open-ended phrase, “any other major restructuring of the 
school’s governance that produces fundamental reform.”80 
In the Government Accounting Office’s national web survey of principals 
of restructuring schools, 40% reported the use of the “any other” option.81 GAO’s 
next highest response was “replacing staff,” which was reported by 27% of the 
respondents (the other restructuring options were in the single digits). In this web 
based survey, 6% of the principals of restructuring schools reported that they did 
not undertake restructuring activities of any sort. 
The Center on Education Policy’s in-depth study of five states’ 
restructuring activities found between 86% and 96% of restructuring schools 
opting for the “any other” approach—a figure much higher than the GAO 
survey.82  
Whether using the GAO numbers or the CEP numbers, “any other” is the 
most popular restructuring option. In the GAO report, schools would typically 
employ multiple strategies. The most prominent of these “any other” activities 
were hiring an outside expert (62%), changing the internal structure (61%), 
implementing a new curriculum (41%), replacing staff (26%),83 extending the day 
(26%) and extending the year (10%).84 
The CEP study found the hiring of an outside expert as a frequently used 
strategy but also reported that most schools retained the same restructuring 
activities and strategies that they had been using before. Typically, the schools 
opted for a potpourri of popular “best practices,” including increased use of data 
to identify student needs, professional development, off-the-shelf reforms, school 
planning, aligning curriculum with standards and assessments, intensive 
academics for needy populations, and extending school day, weeks and years.85 In 
some cases, the previously initiated efforts (often multiple activities within the 
same school) needed time for implementation and maturation. In others, some 
schools continued activities that showed improvements while others simply 
continued their activities independent of effectiveness.86 
The success or potential success of these “any other” efforts is difficult to 
assess within the framework of NCLB. State standards vary considerably, and the 
ease of making AYP differs by state. To complicate matters, the federal law does 
not require tracking of schools in restructuring over multiple years and, for those 
states that do, the systems are quite different. In addition, states do not have to 
monitor the quality or intensity of interventions. In terms of what states allow, 
Maryland restricts schools to the federal options while Michigan allows almost 
anything. Ohio asks the schools to “describe in your own words the options [you] 
took.” (p. 10). Furthermore, the law is silent about what happens after 
restructuring continues into subsequent years—that is, in years six and seven.87 
In terms of making AYP, CEP conducted a regression analysis and found 
that “any other” was statistically no better or worse than EMOs or reconstituted 
school districts in advancing school progress.88 However, caution is required in 
this comparison, as “any other” is a vast and amorphous landscape. Likewise, 
EMOs and reconstitutions (as noted above) have shown limited efficacy in 
restructuring. Thus, little can be concluded from this sparsely studied and diffuse 
area.  
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Both the CEP and GAO studies noted the insufficient funding for NCLB, 
the small amount of “set-aside” improvement money, and limited state capacities 
to assist schools. Local districts simply lack the financial, personnel, time, or 
expertise to carry out any of the four major ultimate reform strategies—even if 
one of those options was their preferred path.89 Thus, states and districts gravitate 
toward the “any other” option. 
 
Summary  
The research on ultimate school restructuring measures is simply stated: 
there is no clear body of evidence that any of them will result in significantly 
improved education. When test score changes are the measure, the differences are 
small and are as likely to be negative as positive. In highly dysfunctional or 
disorderly school environments where dramatic change was needed, some 
positive organizational effects have been reported. However, negative side effects 
are frequently recorded. These include increased segregation, termination of or 
dramatic shifts in ongoing reform efforts, substantial short-term drops in 
achievement scores, and organizational instability. 
State Takeovers. There are few examples of state takeovers, the empirical 
evidence is limited, and the media coverage is extensive. Frequently, a state 
takeover is an intermediate step to a hand-off to private corporations (Educational 
Management Organizations) or to mayors. States lack the capacity to operate 
school districts, takeovers are politically controversial, and they “have yet to 
produce dramatic and consistent increases in student performance.”90 
Private Management (Education Management Organizations). Despite 
a high political profile and publicly touted examples of success (as well as 
failures), the evidence is equivocal. Overall, no consistent test score advantages 
are found, while disruption and teacher turnover are high. Substantial test score 
losses are commonly reported in early years, with some controversial evidence 
suggesting that these losses are recovered in later years. 
Charter Schools. Major national studies consistently indicate that charter 
schools have not demonstrated any clear test score advantage over regular public 
schools after prior achievement and demographic differences are considered. 
Unintended consequences often include increased segregation along ethnic, 
ability and socio-economic lines. No systemic evidence exists that they have 
yielded more innovation in educational practices than have other public schools. 
Reconstituting Schools. The few cases where a large proportion of a 
school’s employees have been changed show a great deal of disruption and no 
particular test score gains. They show no advantage in terms of making adequate 
yearly progress. Although 28 states have reconstitution provisions, it is seldom 
employed as a change strategy. 
“Any Other.” The GAO found 40% of restructuring schools using the 
“any other” option while the Center on Education Policy reports a much higher 
86% to 96% of schools electing “any other” fundamental restructuring. The one 
study available suggests no significant advantage for the “any other” approach, 
but knowledge of the effectiveness of these options is sparse. The poor quality of 
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the data and the variety of approaches hinders high-quality explorations in this 
area. Thus, the “any other” option thrives in a highly populated, yet relatively 
unexplored, nether land of commonly accepted “best practices” that lack 
empirical support. 
 
Discussion 
With reauthorization before Congress and none of the five options 
showing marked success (albeit takeovers and reconstitutions were seldom used), 
a fundamental rethinking of the ultimate sanctions in the NCLB law is needed. 
We must first ascertain if the remedies can be remedied. If they cannot be 
reasonably expected to be effectively improved, then more promising avenues for 
school improvement require exploration.  
 
Can the remedies be remedied? 
Despite a compelling body of evidence to the contrary,91 the core 
assumption of the NCLB law is that education can overcome the effects of 
impacted poverty and deprivation without further broad-based support or social 
interventions. The implicit theory is that if greater pressure is placed on schools 
through increasingly severe sanctions, then positive changes and greater 
efficiencies will be forced onto the schools. This perspective is reflected in 
contentions that “money doesn’t matter”—that input-oriented policies are not 
effective.92 
To support this assumption, restructuring advocates (including Education 
Secretary Arne Duncan) point to model or “lighthouse” high-poverty schools that 
have managed to make test score targets.93 The Center for Comprehensive School 
Reform advances this claim, asserted in the past by the Heritage Foundation and 
Education Trust as well, that high-poverty schools can overcome low 
achievement through internal school reforms.94 The message is that since “model 
schools” made their targets despite poverty and adverse conditions, others can be 
successful as well. 
Unfortunately, success is not so easy. As University of Wisconsin 
Professor Douglas Harris discovered through a longitudinal analysis of these so-
called exemplary schools, they were statistical outliers whose progress almost 
always regressed.95 In multi-state statistical models, the NCLB adequate yearly 
progress goals inexorably consume virtually every school.96 In reviewing the most 
prominent claims for schools that “beat the odds,” Rothstein acknowledges that 
schools can have a great impact on student achievement, but he nevertheless finds 
the assertion that schools alone can overcome the effects of poverty on 
achievement to be unsupportable.97 
In sum, the ultimate restructuring options show little promise for 
providing improvements of the magnitude needed to meet the NCLB 
requirements.  
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The Insufficient Capacity Concern  
The need for extensive improvements in our urban and poorest schools is 
undeniable. Yet, no improvement effort or ultimate sanction can be expected to be 
successful if the resources are insufficient to do the job.  
A near universal lament among states and districts is that they do not have 
the staffing, expertise, organizational capacity or funding to support large-scale 
and effective change strategies. While states vary considerably, insufficient 
numbers of staff, insufficient federal funding, and inadequate data systems thwart 
state capabilities to provide effective assistance.98 A survey of state agencies by 
the American Institutes for Research reported only 16 states claiming a 
“moderate” capacity, while 33 states said their capacity was “limited.”99 For 
example, Massachusetts’ Rennie Center calculated that a $14.35 million increase 
in that state’s capacity was needed if its curriculum, professional development, 
assessment, data analyses and leadership needs were to be met.100 
Assuming this capacity argument to have merit, the states’ emphasis on 
“process” reforms, continuation of earlier efforts, and the use of “any other” 
restructuring system is understandable. Those approaches are inexpensive, and it 
requires limited expertise to ask local districts to develop plans, involve 
stakeholders, analyze data, form committees and the like. While such “drive by” 
technical assistance may be what states and districts can afford, there is little 
evidence that it will provide what they need. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
None of the four major ultimate restructuring options—takeovers, private 
management, charters, and reconstitutions—has been shown to hold particular 
promise as an effective school reform strategy. The evidence suggests that, on 
average, private management and charter schools do not deliver the promised 
improvements. Our knowledge of takeovers and reconstitutions is more limited 
and confounded. Nevertheless, the lack of test score progress under any of these 
options, combined with negative side effects, is at best no improvement and at 
worst harmful. Given that these approaches are being proposed for the nation’s 
most troubled schools, the solutions are likely to be woefully inadequate. 
Intriguing but virtually unexplored terrain is the potpourri of “any other” 
activities. We know little about the effectiveness of these approaches or their 
generalizability. 
If the objective of reforms is improved educational performance, broadly 
conceived, more productive avenues may lie in those activities with direct and 
demonstrable links to the educational, social and health needs of children. This 
requires addressing poverty and health systems, shifting our emphasis to reforms 
with proven effectiveness, implementing and properly funding academic 
programs for our most needy children, and making adequate and focused 
investments in school improvements.  
The greatest danger is not that these ultimate restructuring alternatives are 
simply ineffective; it is that they will deter and distract schools and districts from 
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exploring more promising approaches of achieving the goal of a sound basic 
education for every child. Therefore, it is recommended that policymakers: 
 Refrain from relying on restructuring sanctions (takeovers, private 
management, charters, and reconstitutions) to effect school improvement. They 
have produced negative by-products without yielding systemic positive effects.  
 Refrain from supporting the expansion of charter schools. Evidence indicates 
that, on average, they do not improve test scores or spawn the promised 
innovative practices. Furthermore, they may increase socioeconomic or ethnic 
segregation. 
 Support research on the effectiveness of alternative improvement strategies 
that have been accepted as “best practices” but have not to date been supported 
by careful study. These include school planning, turn-around specialists, data 
analysis, and instructional coaches.  
 Ensure that mandated requirements for technical assistance are met so that 
states and districts have the capacity to implement, support and sustain 
improvements. 
 Support strategies that have been empirically demonstrated to yield significant 
school improvement. These include early education, longer school years and 
days, small school communities, intense personal intervention, strong 
counseling, and social support systems. 
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